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Abstract
We review the oil cycle and evoke future scenarios as to how it will
end.
1 Introduction
Many authors consider exergy production (commonly known as energy pro-
duction in which we include food production) to be an essential factor in eco-
nomic production Cantillon (1755); Jevons (1866); Meadows (1974); Mollison
and Holmgren (1978); Fraser and Rimas (2011); Reynolds (2002); Montgomery
(2007); Hamilton (2009); Ayres and Warr (2009); Ku¨mmel (2011); Giraud and
Kahraman (Giraud and Kahraman); Hamilton (2013); Illig and Schindler (2017);
Charlez (2017); Schindler and Schindler (2018); Hall and Kittgard (2018). In
Diamond (1998), Jared Diamond argues convincingly that a large part of tech-
nological progress is opportunity. We believe that opportunity is tied to exergy
production and its decreasing cost share in periods of economic growth. In this
work we make the ansatz that economic growth is reduced to exergy production.
In Section 2 we give an energy centric explanation of the secular cycles described
in Turchin and Nefedov (2009) based on the economic production theory devel-
oped in Illig and Schindler (2017) and Schindler and Schindler (2018).
Oil is a finite resource. Oil extraction has been increasing since 1857. It
will one day peak and go into decline. Serious estimates as to when that peak
will occur vary from 2018 to 2050 Babusiaux and Bauquis (2017). The primary
dispute among these estimates is with respect to the classification of resources
as reserves or not. Resources are defined as the quantity of oil in place, reserves
are the subset of resources that can be profitably be extracted. The divergence
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of opinions is most significant with respect to unconventional and frontier oil.
In a nutshell: most of these oils were known to exist for over 50 years, the price
of their extraction prevented their classification as reserves until recently, and
their extraction produces more contingent pollution.
In Section 3.1 we investigate an empirical model for oil prices based on
historical extraction rates and interest rates of the Federal Reserve. Our analysis
suggests that peak oil occurs not from lack of oil, but rather from the cost of
extraction rising faster than market prices. We believe low prices resulting in
political instability in oil producing nations will cause the peak to occur sooner,
rather than later.
We will use the following notation throughout the text: Y is a measure of
economic production expressed in currency. The subset YE ⊂ Y is the amount
of money spent on exergy (including food). We will denote the complement of
YE in Y by YE{ thus Y = YE + YE{ . YE{ contains such things as government
bureaucracy, the military, luxury items, education, entertainment, etc. The cost
share of energy in the economy is defined as
C =
YE
Y
=
YE
YE + YE{
. (1.1)
In the sequel, p will loosely denote the market price of oil which is used as a
proxy for the market price of exergy in the oil cycle.
We believe that the correct term is oil extraction, however the oil industry
and out data refers to oil production. We use the terms interchangeably.
In Section 4, we make some recommendations as to positive directions civi-
lization could take in the post oil cycle.
2 Exergy Centric Economic Production Func-
tions and Secular Cycles
We look at secular cycles as described in Turchin and Nefedov (2009) from
the perspective of economic production function theory Schindler and Schindler
(2018); Illig and Schindler (2017) and an energy centric view of the economy.
We refine the analysis in Schindler and Schindler (2018) which used the cona-
tus principle of Spinoza, promoted as a fundamental principle in economics by
Fre´de`ric Lordon Lordon (2003).
Several authors have linked the decline of civilizations to nonrenewable
food production Montgomery (2007); Fraser and Rimas (2011); Diamond (1998,
2011); Schindler and Schindler (2018). We use this as a justification for (H1)
below.
We make the following hypotheses:
(H1) The source of economic production is exergy.
(H2) Growing industries pay relatively good wages.
(H3) Contracting industries pay relatively poor wages.
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(H4) Profits are used to expand.
(H5) Large cost shares lead to political power.
(H6) A small cost share of exergy implies great economic diversity.
(H7) People are more sensitive to the derivative of their situation, or their
relative situation than their absolute situation.
From (H1) we reduce economic growth to exergy production and then ex-
plain secular cycles using the dynamic production function equations Illig and
Schindler (2017); Schindler and Schindler (2018).
A growth period starts from profitable exergy (food) production. From (H1),
(H2), and (H4), this leads to expansion with relatively good wages. From (Il-
lig and Schindler, 2017, Equation (5.10)), we see that at constant price, if the
derivative of the cost share is negative, exergy production produces stronger eco-
nomic growth. We believe that the beginning of the stagflation period begins
when the size of the cost share of exergy begins to grow. If the exergy production
is still growing, the derivative of the cost share of exergy becomes positive due
either to nonrenewable agricultural techniques, environmental degradation, or
depletion of resources. This slows economic growth and decreases economic di-
versity. We believe that the first macroeconomic symptom of rising exergy cost
share is lower wages. From (H5), we see that a sector of the economy having pos-
itive derivative during the growth phase does not contribute to economic growth
but gains political power as the growth phase continues. Moreover, government
support of sectors in YE{ leads to fewer resources dedicated to YE and hence
lower or contracting growth rates. Citizens are unhappy with their government
during the stagflation phase not only because their financial situation stagnates,
but also because of apparent corruption as the government attempts to hold up
portions of the economy that do not contribute to economic growth (for exam-
ple banks that are “too big to fail”). It is tempting to believe that in the case
of shortage of an essential item in the economy the price of that item will rise.
This is disputed in Illig and Schindler (2017) and Schindler and Schindler (2018)
where it is clearly not indicated by the dynamic production function equations.
Indeed the authors speculate that as exergy goes into decline,
∂p
∂E
≥ 0, (2.1)
so that price actually declines with production. Shortage of an essential item
causes the economy to contract which reduces the price. Furthermore price
depends to a large extent on the distribution of wealth. If those who are hungry
do not have money, clearly a rise in the price of food will be limited in the event of
a food shortage. Therefore a shortage of exergy leads to increased importance of
exergy in the economy, decreased wages which increases the difference between
the productive class and the elite class, a negative cost share derivative and
possibly a positive derivative of price with respect to quantity producing a
negative feedback loop accelerating decline.
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There are two recurring currents in political history. One is egalitarian,
the other is fascist by which we mean non egalitarian advocating violence as
a means to maintain hierarchy. We argue that egalitarian thinking dominates
growth phases of economic development. During the stagflation phase fascist
sentiment rises. In growth phases, profits of exergy production rise and these
profits are shared generously amongst increasing numbers. Reasons for a non
egalitarian society may be skin color, religion, skills, education, birth rights, etc.
But in the end, non egalitarian thinking boils down to being able to impose a
non egalitarian system. Fascism may be a defense for survival. For example if
suddenly only enough food is produced for 70% of the population. If the food is
shared equally, everyone starves. If a fascist pecking order is implemented, only
a percentage of the population will die. In any case, rising inequality during
stagflation creates divisions in the society as those with an egalitarian vision
decry the inequality and those with fascist tendency advocate a hierarchy for
wealth distribution defended with the use of force. What is obvious to both sides
is the dysfunction of the status quo. This raises the probability of violence.
Tverberg Tverberg (2017a) noticed a flattening in per capita exergy produc-
tion between 1920 and 1940 to which she attributes the economic depression
(stagflation) of the 1930s which eventually led to the second world war. An-
thracite coal extraction peaked in 1914. The flattening of global exergy per
capita may have been due to lower quality coal replacing high quality coal caus-
ing an increase of the cost share of exergy. Exergy per capita increased after
the second world war because of a shift from coal to oil as a primary motor of
economic growth.
High quality resources are extracted first. As high quality resources are
depleted two competing tendencies appear: decreasing quality of the resource
tending to raise cost share and technology permitting more efficient use and
extraction of the resource decreasing cost share. When the cost share of ex-
ergy increases (particularly food), so does the probability of violence Lagi et al.
(2011). A rise in authoritarianism has been postulated in Heinberg and Crown-
shaw (2018).
From (H7), we see that stagflation tends to breed fear of resource scarcity
and fascist sentiment rises. Thus we make the conjecture that fascist leaders are
more likely to gain power in stagflationary times where as egalitarian leaders
are more probable during times of growth.
3 The Oil Cycle
In Illig and Schindler (2017), the authors consider different scenarios for post
peak oil extraction using the hypothesis:
(H8) For most of the contraction phase of oil extraction,
∂Y
∂E
> 0 and is rela-
tively large.
We update the possible scenarios scenarios giving more precise macro economic
characterizations using the insights provided by an updated price model and
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considering more precise possible economic policy of governments and central
banks.
3.1 An Empirical Study of Oil Prices
In this section we study empirical data in order to understand what the price dy-
namics of the contraction phase of oil extraction might be. The idea behind the
price models from Illig and Schindler (2017) was that since the primary source
of wealth is energy production, much of current price should be determined by
the time series generated solely by production. This was successful during the
growth period of oil production from 1937 to 1970 when oil extraction rates
grew at at more than 7% per year. During the stagflationary period of oil from
1965 to 2017 the effort was only satisfactory. Many authors have written on the
relationship between interest rates and oil prices for example Likvern (2015);
Tverberg (2015, 2017b). We thus include the Federal Reserve rate with the time
series of oil extraction in the new model. We use the Federal Reserve rate as a
proxy of interest rates on oil because the U.S. dollar is the primary currency in
which oil was traded in the studied time period.
We worked with data from BP’s 2018 Statistical Review and from the Fed-
fund 2017. We used prices and extraction data from the BP’s data set:
• Annual crude oil prices in 2017 US dollars per barrel (deflated using the
Consumer Price Index for the US) available from 1861 to 2017.
• Annual world oil production expressed as a daily mean in millions barrels
per day (MMbbl per day) from 1965 to 2017. These data include crude
oil, shale oil, oil sands and NGLs (natural gas liquids - the liquid content
of natural gas where this is recovered separately). However, these data
exclude liquid fuels from other sources such as biomass and derivatives of
coal and natural gas.
Remark 3.1. All data we use is very approximate. Laherre`re Laherre`re (2014)
has exhaustively documented incoherence in extraction data from all standard
sources. Laherre`re states (correctly) that since the data is accurate to at most
3%, it is both illogical and misleading to provide the data beyond 2 decimal
points. We repeat the error of BP of including extra decimals because we did not
want to alter the data. We use a single price for the price of oil provided by BP,
but there is a large spectrum of prices for oil of different densities, chemistry,
and provenance Laherre`re (2015). BP groups extraction data for crude oil,
condensate, and NGL’s, a large spectrum of products not all used for the same
purpose and of course with different prices. The fact that our regression analysis
works suggests that there are correlations within the data and averaging going
on.
In Figure 1 we show the extraction rate in millions of barrels per day (MMbbl
per day) from 1965 to 2017. In Figure 2 we represent the federal funds rate.
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Figure 2:
In light of Remark 3.1, our aim is not to get the best fit possible, but to
understand factors that influence price.
Let (Pt)t denote the time series of oil prices (in 2017 dollars adjusted for
inflation) from year 1965 to year 2017 and (Qt)t the time series of quantities of
oil extracted (in million barrels daily) from year 1965 to year 2017 for BP data.
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3.1.1 Price explained by oil extraction and interest rates
The approach we consider here is structural. We try to derive information on the
price from the time series of oil extraction and interest rates. From Figure 3, one
sees that Qt cannot explain Pt because the price P is not uniquely determined
by the extracted quantity Q, in other words several prices correspond to the
same produced quantity. For this reason, we use, in addition to Qt and the
interest rate τ , the lag-1 difference and of the series (Qt)t at year t:
∇Qt def= Qt −Qt−1. (3.1)
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Figure 3:
We consider the following model:
pt = aτ + bQt + c∇Qt + t (3.2)
where a, b, c are coefficients determined by the linear regression and (t)t is a
centered second order stationary process. Defining Pt
def
= exp(pt), equation (3.2)
is equivalent to
Pt = exp(aτ + bQt + c∇Qt + t). (3.3)
The dependency of price Pt on these variables is non-linear. As the logarithm
function flattens large values, the model takes into account the inelasticity of
oil prices. That is, small changes in the supply provoke large changes in price.
The R output for the linear regression with the data starting at year 1965
is given in Appendix A. Note that we have lost a year because of the lag-1
differences (∇Qt)t that are only available form year 1966 with the data set
starting in 1965. Adjusted R-squared being almost 0.99 means that the model
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explains the variation in price as well as can be hoped for given the quality of
the data. From the stars in the R output, we obtain that all coefficients in the
model are significant. The estimated values are:
a ≈ 1.17
b ≈ 0.05
c ≈ −0.07
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Figure 4:
We have plotted the adjusted prices and the real prices in Figure 4.
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We tested the stability of the coefficients by trying the regression in different
sub-intervals and found that the coefficients for Q and ∇Q were relatively stable
but that the coefficient for interest rates was not, see Figure 6. All coefficients
were more stable than in the model studied in Illig and Schindler (2017). It is
clear that the model cannot be used to estimate future prices because we do not
know what future interest rates will be. We can however make scenarios based
on different interest rate policies from the Federal Reserve and more generally,
central banks, if we can understand the role of interest rates.
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Figure 6: Adjusted price and linear regression coefficients for three periods
3.2 Interpretation of the results
We compare and contrast the model with that in Illig and Schindler (2017). The
interest rate coefficient replaces the constant term in Illig and Schindler (2017),
(better) explains the information in the second derivative term and part of the
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first derivative term. Thus it contains a great deal of information with respect
to the price.
In the current capitalist system, a primary source of money creation is debt
Dalio (2015). We distinguish between the financial economy and the real econ-
omy where the real economy is the amount of goods and services in the economy
and the financial economy is based on currency exchanges. If too much money
is in circulation, the financial economy gets “ahead” of the real economy and
inflation increases. If on the other hand, too little money is in circulation, the
financial economy can smother the real economy because not enough money
circulates causing deflation leading to a negative feedback loop with respect to
investment Dalio (2015). We make the following hypothesis:
(H9) Decreasing interest rates stimulates borrowing which creates money stim-
ulating the financial economy. Increasing interest rates has the opposite
effect.
In light of (H9), it is significant that the coefficient of interest rates is positive
in the global model and in the first two split periods. It is slightly negative in the
last period indicating a switch in Federal Reserve policy. From 1980 to 1995,
the major concern of the Federal Reserve was inflation. High oil prices were
associated with high inflation so that high oil prices triggered higher interest
rates. In the late 1990s, the concern switched to deflation. Or perhaps the
finance industry pushed policies that increased asset prices, or a combination of
both factors influenced Federal Reserve policy. In this period, we believe that
we are seeing the effects of (H9). Note that this is the period in which the fitted
complete model has the worst fit. We note also that central banks have been
using more than interest rates since the financial crisis in 2008 to stimulate the
economy. Central banks have been buying financial assets, mostly bonds, but
also stocks and currently own approximately 10% of all financial assets, bought
with freshly created money Prins (2018). As a consequence, long term rates are
lower. We therefore believe that the official Federal Reserve rate since 2008 is
high relative to what the true borrowing rate of the economy is.
We note also that the coefficient of extraction rate remains positive glob-
ally and in each subinterval. Thus
∂p
∂q
> 0 as one expects from the dynamic
production function equations. In Illig and Schindler (2017) it was speculated
that oil production was less important during the 1990’s because the coefficient
of production was negative with that model. The current model suggests that
interest rates were the factor damping oil prices during this time.
The coefficient of the derivative term is negative and greater than the coef-
ficient of quantity explaining why prices rise when extraction rates fall (at least
initially). But the relative size is much smaller than in the Illig and Schindler
(2017) model. When oil extraction rates fall, the real economy slows depressing
the financial economy encouraging lower interest rates which support prices. If
the prices rise too much, interest rise because of fears of inflation.
It is well known that oil price is correlated to world GDP. We also note that
the interest rate of the Federal Reserve is correlated to margins in the fossil fuel
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industry Damodaran (2015). The preceding correlations lead us to the following
conjectures:
Conjecture 3.1. 1. The “best” rate for the Federal Reserve in order to fit
the real economy with the financial economy is the margin for exergy pro-
duction.
2. Three years of exergy production data coupled with the margins of the
exergy sector give a more informative measure of the economy than the
world GDP.
In other words, we postulate that the margins of exergy production give
interest rates which fulfill the Federal Reserve’s mandate rather than vice-versa.
Conjecture 3.1 suggests that the model underestimates the price in the period
2010 to 2014 because interest rates below profit margins in exergy production.
When interest rates are too low, investment choices tend to be worse than
normal Dalio (2015) leading to high inflation. The inflation, though not present
in common metrics, can be seen where the money has been created since 2008,
in asset values.
3.3 The oil cycle
The oil industry has struggled with over production since its inception creating
boom bust cycles. Unregulated producers will extract as much oil as they can
until the market price exceeds production costs causing a fall in investment
which leads to slower (possibly negative) production growth and hence price
spikes which leads to another investment phase. Because of the nature of the
oil industry, there is a lag between the start of investment and an increase in
production just as there is a lag between a drop of investment and a decrease
in production. The industry is very capital intensive. Offshore projects can
take as long as 10 years to bring online. Moreover, oil wells that don’t pay
out are not plugged until operating expenses (or lifting oil expenses, LOE) are
below the market price for oil. If a well doesn’t pay out, bankruptcy is declared,
creditors become owners who generally push the well as hard as possible to get
as much money back as quickly as possible. Financial stress leads to short term
thinking Mullainathan and Shafir (2013). Short term thinking means producing
as much as possible immediately to pay creditors regardless of the market price
and putting off long term projects such as prospecting or long term development
projects.
Remark 3.2. Hypotheses (H2) and (H3) imply that during boom cycles, wages
and hence extraction costs rise while during bust cycles, wages and hence pro-
duction costs fall. This is observed empirically with the cost of oil extraction
services rising during boom periods and falling during bust periods Babusiaux
and Bauquis (2017).
Rockefeller and Standard oil attempted to rein in overproduction using
monopoly tactics in the 1890’s but these attempts were deemed anti competitive
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and Standard Oil was broken up. In 1928 the dominant oil producers attempted
to rein in production at Achnacarry with a cartel agreement but the discovery
of the East Texas super giant oil field in 1930 soon drove the price of oil below
production costs. This lead to regulation by the Texas Rail Road Commission
in the 1930’s necessary until sub $10 oil peaked in the 1970’s. Internationally,
the so called seven sisters used their financial clout to limit production. They
bought the rights to develop oil fields in the Persian Gulf and then did not de-
velop the fields. The price spikes of the 1970’s and early 1980’s enabled the oil
companies to make the necessary investments in Alaska and the North Sea to
bring on sub $20 oil Auzanneau (2016). These investments allowed production
to continue rising in the low price period 1986–2002, when lack of long term
investment finally lead to a drop in production.
We have two competing forces on prices and supply of exergy. Carey King
King (2015) postulates a global minimum in the cost share of exergy around 2000
due to increased extraction costs. From our analysis of the dynamic production
equations, this indicates slower economic growth and lower wages. The first
industry to suffer from slower economic growth should be the financial industry
which depends on economic growth to make returns. Central banks however
since the financial crisis in 2008 have engaged in unprecedented money creation
Prins (2018) to buy financial assets (mostly bonds). Central banks own $ 22
trillion worth of assets (nearly $ 3000 per world capita) which were purchased
from money created out of thin air. Not only is this highly inflationary, raising
the price of financial assets, but it encourages financial bubbles Ayres (2014).
Inflation is a surreptitious way of reducing wages. The most obvious way in
which this inflation is expressing itself is the increase in land prices in large
metropolitan cities which increases the cost of housing for tenants and prevents
wage earners from being able to purchase real estate.
Remark 3.3. From 1930 to the present, the cost share of the financial sector
has grown significantly with the economy. This indicates a positive derivative
of the cost share of the financial sector which shows that the financial sector is
very inefficient. If the financial sector were efficient, it would direct resources
to sectors of the economy that would grow faster than itself and the cost share
of the financial sector would decrease with an expanding economy.
The oil extraction rates have continued to increase since the price downturn
in 2014 for several reasons.
1. The years of increasing investment took several years to bear fruit. Pro-
duction was essentially flat from 2005–2010. Similarly when prices de-
creased, the resulting decrease in investment requires several years to be
observed in production rates.
2. As mentioned, short term thinking pushes oil companies to prioritize
projects that produce oil quickly at the expense of projects that would
produce oil after 2020.
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3. The fore mentioned increase in asset prices because it is very capital in-
tensive: raising equity and borrowing have been made easier. In other
terms, the increase in asset values has allowed cE > YEp , where cE is the
cost of extracting petroleum and YEp is the amount spent on petroleum.
Between 2000 and 2013, oil industry capital expenses increased by almost 11%
per year Kopits (2014); Mushalnik (2016). After the stagnant extraction rates
between 2005 and 2010 the increase in capital spending brought up production
by around 10% from 2010 to 2016. Capital spending dropped significantly in
2015 and 2016 before stabilizing in 2017 Tuttle (2017). Since the price drop in
November 2014, Short term thinking is rife not only within the industry but
for investors. Prospecting budgets have dropped. Discoveries are at historic
lows Staff (2017a). The increase in production has been accompanied by a
corresponding increase in debt Staff (2017b). The common accounting principle
of computing net present value means that the most economic way of exploiting
an oil field is to front load production. Investors have poured money into Light
Tight Oil, or LTO, produced from fracking. This production is extremely front
loaded, around 45% of a well’s total production occurs in the first three years of
production Peters (Peters) so increasing production requires constant drilling.
Moreover LTO has only been marginally profitable and carries an immense
amount of debt Likvern (2017); Cunningham (2018). As of August 31, 2018,
Haynes and Boone has tracked 160 North American bankruptcies concerning
$ 92.9 billion worth of debt since the beginning of 2015 of which 22 producers
concerning $ 9 billion worth of debt occurred in 2018 Staff (2018b). Several
banks and the International Energy Agency are warning of supply problems
in the early 2020’s if investment does not increase Rapier (2018). These are
signs of rising cost share of oil. If the monetary expansion should cease, and
the financial sector require payment of dues, a deflationary debt spiral can
ensue causing decreased production. The monetary expansion has helped the
financial industry which has indirectly helped oil production as a large part of
new investment has been in oil production.
During the growth phase, oil extraction payed for government bureaucracy
through taxes, paid investors with positive returns, payed workers with good
salaries. In the current stagflation phase, salaries in the oil and gas industry
are declining, oil extraction often benefits from tax breaks paying for less gov-
ernment bureaucracy, and investors are making poor returns. Hypothesis (H8)
and (Illig and Schindler, 2017, Equation (5.7)) give the following bound on price
increases in the case of a contraction in supply:
Ip(t1, t2) < IC(t1, t2)/IE(t1, t2), (3.4)
where Ix(t1, t2)
def
= x(t2)/x(t1) is the index of the quantity x(t). If Conjecture 3.1
is correct, our empirical model suggests that returns will be lower than many
investors anticipate.
The example of the Soviet Union shows that oil extraction and the economy
can collapse even though resources are available. Soviet oil extraction peaked in
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1987. It fell sharply until after the Soviet Union had collapsed in 1991. Russian
oil extraction, with the aid of foreign investment beginning in the mid 1990’s,
has been rising since 2000 achieving 1988 levels in 2014. This indicates that a
negative feedback loop with respect to extraction rates can appear if too many
resources are devoted to YE{ . Venezuela seems to be falling into a deflationary
debt spiral leading to loss of production. That is to say the financial sector lent
Venezuela more money than the country can pay back with oil revenues. The
debt payments required by the financial sector do not leave enough resources to
maintain production levels. As production falls, the State oil company is even
less able to pay the financial sector and the process self reinforces. Officially
Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world, and yet production has fallen
by about 1/3 in 2 years and workers are quitting because of low pay and poor
working conditions Buitrago and Ulmer (2018).
3.4 Scenario Update
In Illig and Schindler (2017) some common future scenario’s were evaluated.
Since that time, oil production has been higher than many analysts had pre-
dicted, notably with respect to unconventional LTO in the U.S. and oil sands
in Canada. However, we see the probability of an asymmetric production curve
increasing.
The end of stagflation is characterized by inter-elite competition Turchin
and Nefedov (2009). From In Illig and Schindler (2017) a Seneca cliff Bardi
(2011), or fast decline in oil production was evoked with respect to conflict in
the Middle East. Here we highlight additional factors rendering a fast decline
in oil production more probable.
1. Competition between elite energy producers.
2. Competition between elite energy producers and elite investors.
3. Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) techniques.
4. Armed conflict.
5. Economic collapse.
Note than during the energy growth period of the 20th century, energy
producers in general were not in competition. Growth of one sector of energy
production did not decrease production in another sector. An increase in one
area could actually increase production in another sector if energy from one
sector was used in the production of another, for example oil could be used to
mine uranium increasing nuclear energy production. Competition among energy
producers is a sign of scarcity, for example kerosene replaced whale oil because
there were fewer whales and whale oil production was going into decline Bardi
(2004). In the same way, we believe that replacement of coal power plants by
gas fired electricity generation is a sign of peaking of coal production. For oil,
until recently, if low prices lead to a reduction in production, it was via low
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cost producers in the Middle East rather than high cost producers. This is
because low cost Middle East producers where not under financial stress and
could have a longer term perspective. Financial stress leads to production at
as high a rate as possible in efforts to force competition out of the market and
unaware of (2.1). Thus, since the price downturn in 2014, producers have been
producing as fast as possible to drive competition from the market. The loser
in the competition has been long term projects offshore where projects have
been postponed and lower prospecting budgets have contributed to discoveries
dropping to historic lows Staff (2017a).
The financial sector can lead to negative feedback cycles by simultaneously
requiring debt repayments and cutting off additional financing. In this scenario
cE > Ep for a length of time after which the investment community demands
debt repayment and cuts off new funding. This leads to a deflationary debt spiral
in which lower production leads to more financial stress, leading to less lending
and less debt repayments so money exits the system reducing prices forcing
wages to go down, etc. This is the current situation in Venezuela. Officially
Venezuela has the highest oil reserves of any nation, there is oil in the country
but because of debt defaults, investors refuse to lend money. Because spending
on oil production infrastructure has lagged, oil production is falling making
current debt repayments increasingly difficult. Wages are falling and workers
are leaving Buitrago and Ulmer (2018) (we are speaking of dollar denominated
wages, the local currency suffers from hyperinflation with prices rising faster
that wages).
We anticipate more countries following Venezuela into a deflationary debt
spiral leading to lower oil production, decreased economic activity, and height-
ened tension between the financial sector and the oil extraction industry and
contributing to political instability. Countries that seem to be coming off of
plateau or increasing decline in oil extraction include Algeria, Angola, Colom-
bia, China, and Mexico. Iran’s oil fields have suffered from years of under
investment Staff (2018a). Sanctions kept production down during several years
of high prices. The end of sanctions lead to increase oil extraction rates, but in
a low price environment. Now as oil prices climb, President Trump has renewed
sanctions which could push Iran into a production decline.
EOR techniques in general help old oil fields maintain plateau production
but when decline finally sets in, the rates are higher Babusiaux and Bauquis
(2017).
Armed conflict such as in Libya can affect oil production by discouraging
investors and out right destroying oil production and storage infrastructure.
Because of increasing extraction costs the oil industry needs higher prices to
make good returns. In 2005, $50 a barrel was considered a high price, in 2015,
it was considered a low price. Increasing decline rates mean that production
is more sensitive to a bust cycle. The 1986-2002 bust cycle saw 15 years of
increasing production despite the bust. The bust cycle that began year end
2014 will probably see decline in production in less than 7 years. The debt of
the oil industry is higher than it was at the end of the last bust cycle. Debt
maturities will increase into the early 2020’s, precisely when several analysts are
16
predicting problems with supply. For these reasons we believe that extraction
rates will not rise quickly (if at all) in the next boom cycle.
The high oil prices of the next boom cycle will increase food prices and hence
political instability Lagi et al. (2011). Many oil producing countries will devote
resources to YE{ rather than oil extraction precipitating a decline in production
and a deflationary spiral.
The vast money creation by central banks since the 2008 financial crisis has
made the world financial system more fragile Prins (2018); Ayres (2014) and
created distortions in the value of assets. The economist Kenneth Rogoff Rogoff
(2016) has proposed to eliminate cash in order to prepare for negative interest
rates to solve the next financial crisis.
Dissatisfied voters are electing more outside candidates whose policies may
well provoke violence. We also expect more autocratic governments, an idea
explored in Heinberg and Crownshaw (2018).
The most common economic system is a system in which money is created
through debt. It is easier to repay debt when the economy is growing Tverberg
(2012). It is not clear that the current economic system can function in the face
of sustained economic contraction. A decrease in oil production could cause a
spike in oil prices causing defaults in YE{ provoking a collapse in world markets
and loss of confidence in the system which permits oil extraction.
With the current economic system, the end of any mineral extraction busi-
ness is bankruptcy. As long as the financial system allocates funds, the business
will continue. When the business becomes chronically unprofitable, the financial
sector will cut off funding and the business will fail.
4 Recommendations
The destruction of the cedar forest by Gilgamesh and Enkidu shows that the
problem of over exploitation of resources is as old as civilization itself. Capital-
ism’s imperative of economic growth makes the economic system very suscepti-
ble to over exploitation of resources. Though we expect increased violence and
tensions in the next few years, there are opportunities to change the direction
of civilization and put it on a more sustainable trajectory.
The goal of reducing violence and suffering is incompatible with the goal of
infinite economic growth. Clarifying our goals is the first step in changing the
direction of civilization. In the last 100 years we have learned a great deal about
human behavior which we could use to devise better political systems.
A word about agriculture. Agriculture is the source of 25% of global green-
house gas emissions while all of transportation is only 176% The so called
“green” agricultural revolution more appropriately called industrial agriculture
revolution optimized productivity in the sense that the maximum amount of
food per hour of human labor was produced using large fossil fuel inputs. This
decreased the cost share of food as long as labor is expensive and energy is
cheap. However ecoagricultural techniques produce more food per unit area
de Schutter (2014) with minimal fossil fuel inputs at the price of greater labor
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inputs. Ecoagricultural techniques sequester carbon from the atmosphere into
the soil. The best indicator of high quality soil is the amount of carbon it con-
tains. Moving towards ecoagricultural techniques not only gives local resilience
in the face of rising prices of industrial agriculture, but is probably the most
powerful tool in fighting global warming Toensmeier (2016). After the collapse
of the Soviet Union, oil supplies to Cuba and North Korea dropped abruptly.
An estimated 3 to 5 % of North Korea’s population starved to death. Cuba
adopted ecoagricultural techniques and avoided famine Schindler and Schindler
(2018). Embracing ecoagricultural techniques should be a priority.
The political commentator E´tienne Chouard encourages people to practice
writing constitutions in order to have something to propose in the event of a
failed government. He notes that it is not that hard to write more egalitar-
ian constitutions that are better adapted to make political decisions than the
constitutions currently in use.
There are broad international movements, exploring the next economic sys-
tem which one might broadly characterize as transition movements Hopkins
(2008). These grass roots movements, emphasizing local resilience with respect
to food and energy production have the potential to greatly reduce future stress.
Blockchain technology offers the possibility of exploring new currencies. The
first “free” as in freedom currency based on the relative theory of money. The
G¯1 went into circulation in 2017. Just as “free” software is software in the
service of humanity rather than profits, the G¯1 is a currency in the service of
humanity rather than speculators.
A R output
Call:
lm(formula = log(Price66) ~ Quantity66 + DQuantity66 + Rate66 +
0)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.98697 -0.29023 -0.03503 0.50101 0.91086
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Quantity66 0.04891 0.00151 32.387 < 2e-16 ***
DQuantity66 -0.07328 0.03407 -2.151 0.0365 *
Rate66 1.16999 0.17885 6.542 3.4e-08 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.4692 on 49 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.9858, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9849
F-statistic: 1132 on 3 and 49 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
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